Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
1992 United States Supreme Court case / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), is a 1992 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary market for its equipment—copier-duplicators and other imaging equipment—nonetheless, it could have sufficient market power in the secondary aftermarket for repair parts to be liable under the antitrust laws for its exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket.[1] The reason was that it was possible that, once customers were committed to the particular brand by having purchased a unit, they were "locked in" and no longer had any realistic alternative to turn to for repair parts.
Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc. | |
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Argued December 10, 1991 Decided June 8, 1992 | |
Full case name | Eastman Kodak Company, Petitioner v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al. |
Citations | 504 U.S. 451 (more) 112 S. Ct. 2072; 119 L. Ed. 2d 265; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3405; 60 U.S.L.W. 4465; 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,839; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4823; 92 Daily Journal DAR 7688; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 331 |
Case history | |
Prior | Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17218 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1988); 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990); cert. granted, 501 U.S. 1216 (1991). |
Subsequent | On remand, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998). |
Holding | |
Even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary market for its equipment, it could have sufficient market power (based on purchasers' being "locked in" to its product) in the secondary aftermarket (or submarket) for repair parts to be liable under the antitrust laws for its exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter |
Dissent | Scalia, joined by O'Connor, Thomas |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Antitrust Act |